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Insight, part of a Special Feature on Navigating Trade-Offs: Working for Conservation and
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Improving the Effectiveness of Interventions to Balance Conservation and
Development: a Conceptual Framework
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ABSTRACT. There are numerous case studies around the world describing integrated conservation and
development projects (ICDPs). Recently some localized syntheses have been published that use
sophisticated statistics to identify patterns and causal linkages, but no attempt has yet been made to draw
together lessons from across the globe. This paper is an attempt to provide a framework for such an analysis.
A set of lessons is proposed for improving the prospects of ICDPs by giving consideration to each of the
five capitals: natural, social, human, built, and financial. The language of ICDPs has been adopted by
development agencies of all persuasions. There is now some urgency to identify the characteristics of the
environment and the community in which success is most likely. This paper is intended as a step in that
direction.
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INTRODUCTION
The first use of the term “integrated conservation
and development project” (ICDP ) that we have been
able to locate was in the Luangwa Valley Integrated
Conservation and Development Project jointly
undertaken by FAO and the Government of Zambia
in the mid-1960s (Child and Dalal-Clayton 2004).
This project set out to manage wildlife sustainably
for the benefit of the local people. Since then, the
term ICDP has been widely applied to many
different types of conservation initiatives. By the
1990s the concept had been embraced as a standard
part of the aims of many major international
organizations (Wells et al. 2004); organizations
whose primary mission is conservation and those
whose mission is development have both adopted
the ICDP approach in some form (Campbell and
Vainio-Mattila 2003). As a result, the definition of
the ICDP has expanded, so that projects of this type
are now described as “...approaches to the
management and conservation of natural resources
in areas of significant biodiversity value that aim to
reconcile the biodiversity conservation and socioeconomic development interests of multiple
stakeholders at local, regional, national and
international levels” (Franks and Blomley 2004).
1

However, regardless of definition, there has been a
long history of concern about the effectiveness of
ICDPs in meeting either conservation or
development objectives (Adams et al. 2004,
McShane and Wells 2004). Integration is still the
exception, and synergies do not emerge naturally
(Barrett et al. 2005). Given the ubiquity of the
rhetoric about reconciling the imperatives of local
livelihood improvement with the desire to reduce,
minimize, or even reverse environmental
degradation, it might be assumed that an established
methodology must be available to guide the
implementation of these projects.
However, there is none. Analysis of many ICDPs
has shown that success tends to be fleeting and
fragile. Failure leads inevitably to loss of
biodiversity, and purported successes are rarely
associated with lasting improvements in the wealth
and well-being of the communities in which the
interventions were undertaken (McShane and Wells
2004, Robinson and Redford 2004, Sayer and
Campbell 2004, Wells et al. 2004). Such successes
are typically described in anecdotal case studies and
often appear idiosyncratic, temporary, and
contingent on local history, society, and
environment. That said, there have been some
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longer-term success stories, and enough attempts at
ICDPs that Sayer and Campbell (2004) believe it
should be possible to construct hypotheses about the
factors most likely to determine project outcomes
that can be formally tested on a global scale. Ferraro
and Pattanayak (2006) go a step further in
suggesting that ICDPs need to be tested against a
null hypothesis of no intervention at all, following
medical models of evidence-based policy
implementation (Sutherland et al. 2004).
A number of attempts have already been made to
test hypotheses about the success and failure of
ICDPs. Salafsky et al. (2002) tested the hypothesis
that, if a viable enterprise is linked to the
biodiversity of a protected area and generates
benefits for a community of stakeholders, then the
stakeholders will act to counter the threats to the
resource (see also Salafsky et al. 2001). The results
were inconclusive but suggested an alternative
hypothesis: that conservation benefits from
enterprise development around protected areas are
products of the action learning that occurs during
enterprise development itself, regardless of the
enterprise’s eventual financial success. More
recently, Brooks et al. (2006) tested a set of
hypotheses based on a numerical analysis of 28
selected ICDPs associated with protected areas
drawn from a pool of 150 published papers. They
postulated that success measured against a set of
ecological, economic, attitudinal, and behavioral
parameters would be improved through the extent
to which protected areas are used by communities,
the extent to which projects increase the integration
of communities into wider markets, the degree of
decentralization of decision making about
conservation management, and the homogeneity of
the communities associated with the protected
areas. Their results suggested that decentralization
was most likely to improve all four measures of
success provided that strong local structures were
in place. However, market integration and
utilization had positive effects only on behavior and
economics. Information on community homogeneity
was rarely available, and no effects of this could be
detected. The importance of decision-making
decentralization is corroborated by Hayes and
Ostrom (2005), who discovered, in a global review
of forest conditions inside and outside reserves, that
forest condition was related more closely to local
involvement in setting rules on forest use than to
any central system of park designation.

Agrawal and Chhatre (2006) took another approach.
Following Agrawal (2001), they combined
quantitative analysis with a qualitative approach
using case studies to understand the biophysical,
demographic, economic, institutional, and sociopolitical factors affecting the management of
common property forests at 95 sites in the Indian
Himalaya. Their results demonstrated the
importance of biophysical constraints on outcomes
and the likely biases in results if only the other
factors are considered in the analysis. They also
verified in a local setting theoretical assumptions
about the link between local reliance on forest
products and the condition of forests, about
population stability compared to populations with
a high rate of turnover, and about the importance of
women. Their study, however, did not set out to
measure the reverse relationship, i.e., the effect of
environmental conditions on well-being, and only
ambiguously considered the influence of
interventions.
A local study of 40 community-based marine
protected areas in the Philippines, which aimed to
determine the frequency of win-win vs. lose-lose or
trade-off outcomes as measured in terms of
children’s nutritional status and coral reef health,
did look directly for such relationships but could
conclude only that the enforcement of protection for
marine protected areas did not have a negative effect
on child health and may improve it over a longer
period (Gjertsen 2005). Other studies, such as
Gibson et al. (2005) and Struhsaker et al. (2005),
used statistical techniques to examine specific
issues such as the role of enforcement in natural
resource quality. In the former, the quality of 191
forests scattered across most continents was
correlated with the consistency of local
enforcement; in the latter, the condition of 16 rainforest reserves in Africa correlated best with
funding for enforcement and not at all with the
presence of ICDPs.
Although these recent statistical approaches are
usually based on conditions during a single short
study period, the more common analyses of ICDPs
have used case studies that cover the evolution of
interventions over both longer and shorter periods
of time. For instance, McShane and Newby (2004)
described the findings from seven well-resourced
Tropical Forest Portfolio projects run by the Dutch
Directorate-General for International Cooperation
and the World Wildlife Fund over 5 yr to test
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assumptions in the areas of livelihood development,
capacity development, institutional support, and
policy factors. For 13 assumptions, they found no
fewer than 25 constraints inhibiting success, with
the only consistent pattern being the need to work
across a range of scales. They concluded that it was
necessary to identify links between national and
regional policy and local ICDP objectives, to
recognize explicitly the trade-offs and compromises
that were necessary, and to have donors who were
willing to tolerate failure as part of a process of
learning.
Drawing on a broader range of examples, Wells et
al. (2004) identified a suite of factors that have been
associated with failed ICDPs in the past, including
over-optimistic goals, weak assumptions, unconvincing
local participation, targeting of the wrong threats,
uncertain financial sustainability, low benefit
generation, and the need by donors for rapid success
readily identifiable as their own. They go on to
suggest that ICDPs are more likely to succeed when
there is a proper understanding of the root causes of
environmental degradation and when relevant
national and regional policies are understood. It was
also considered important that arrangements be in
place for adaptive management, that targets and
trade-offs be explicit, that the work be undertaken
across a range of scales, that appropriate incentives
for conservation be guaranteed, and that there be
effective engagement with stakeholders.
A common criticism in recent analyses of ICDPs
has been their failure to acknowledge the scarcity
of win-win situations and the need to address tradeoff situations as part of integration (Robinson and
Redford 2004). Adams et al. (2004) suggest that this
shortcoming arises from the failure to recognize
four realities of integrating conservation and
development: (1) poverty and conservation are
separate policy realms with little opportunity for
integration, (2) conservation will be undermined
unless poverty is alleviated, (3) there is a moral
obligation for conservation not to compromise
poverty reduction, and (4) poverty reduction itself
depends on the conservation of living resources.
Additionally, in their review of the science of
sustainable development, again based on case
studies, Sayer and Campbell (2004) suggest that
successful ICDPs require an understanding of
existing environmental and social trajectories as
well as action research and the use of both local and
external knowledge. All significant stakeholders

must be involved, and these stakeholders must also
help determine appropriate measures of success.
Sayer and Campbell (2004) also maintain that stable
and fair tenure and governance arrangements and
incentive payments are important and that natural
resource scientists should be associated with
management.
Many of these analyses have overlapping
recommendations, and in this paper we take up the
challenge of Sayer and Campbell (2004) to
formulate a set of “lessons” on the factors likely to
lead to successful ICDPs. Although these lessons
are extracted from past and present experiments
with ICDPs, we urge conservation and development
analysts to formulate them as hypotheses for
rigorous testing, drawing on the now numerous case
studies around the world in ways that are statistically
defensible.
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Integrated conservation and development projects
(ICDPs) have taken widely varying approaches to
addressing their objectives. Many of those
sponsored by environmental organizations are
staffed by biologists and focus on the management
of the natural capital of the area. Humanitarian
organizations often focus on the health, education,
and skills of the human population, or the human
capital. Government aid agencies have recently paid
considerable attention to issues of legality,
governance, law, and policy, i.e., social capital.
Development banks are concerned with infrastructure
and job creation, which are forms of built capital.
Finally, many foundations have recently made
attempts to achieve conservation through payments
for environmental services, which enhances local
financial capital.
When ICDPs aim to improve the capital assets of
the area and its population, they invest in these five
capital assets: natural, human, social, built, and
financial (Carney 1998, Bebbington 1999).
However, this type of investment often seems
arbitrary because it fails to take into account local
states and trends in capital assets that are already
present. For instance, when people are living in
extreme poverty, it will usually be more important
to invest in their health and education and in the
productivity of their agriculture than in the
protection of their forests. When their material
needs are adequately met, then the quality and
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sustainability of their lives may be better achieved
by investing in their natural capital, for example,
amenity and/or nature reserves.
Our central argument is that ICDPs have to be based
upon an understanding of the states and trends of
the capital assets of the concerned populations, and
that interventions should be made in ways that lead
to balanced and sustainable improvements in the
capital assets framework (Campbell et al. 2001).
This provides the foundation of a conceptual
framework for designing conservation and
development interventions. In the following
sections we discuss the issues that have to be
addressed when building the capital assets of an area
in which there are both conservation and
development needs.
NATURAL CAPITAL
Biophysical context
As noted by Agrawal and Chhatre (2006),
remarkably few studies of integrated conservation
and development projects (ICDPs) acknowledge
biophysical constraints on the potential ways in
which the two contrasting aims, conservation and
development, can be reconciled, despite the fact that
these studies are often undertaken by biologists.
Soils, climate, and other biophysical factors place
an absolute limit on the extent to which productivity
can be enhanced to compensate for loss of
production from the protected biodiverse parts of
the landscape or to supply an increasing population.
Many studies show that the extraction rates of
nontimber forest products and other commodities
that are potentially compatible with biodiversity
conservation can rapidly exceed environmental
limits. Nevertheless, there are also many naïve
examples of attempts to increase the levels of
extraction of such products without understanding
the ecological constraints (e.g., Schröder 2001).
This does not mean that community development
and conservation are impossible in landscapes
operating near their physical capacity to support
humans. Rather, as the ratio of humans to landscape
productivity increases, the emphasis of external
investment may need to shift from natural resource
extraction to knowledge-based industries that do not
remove resources from the immediate environment.
However, knowledge-based industries are also
under ecological constraints. Community-based

ecotourism in particular is widely promoted as a key
instrument of ICDPs, even though the empirical
evidence for its effectiveness in either increasing
wealth or protecting the environment is at best
patchy (Wunder 2001, Salafsky et al. 2001, Kiss
2004a). For example, Burke (2004) and du Toit
(2004) imply a negative correlation between per
capita income from tourism and rainfall in Africa,
because large animals are easier to see in open
habitats, and the opportunity costs are lower, than
in highly biodiverse and productive but visually
impenetrable rain forest. Many of the most
biodiverse sites are inaccessible and uncomfortable
without major capital input and marketing that, in
many cases, may threaten their conservation values.
Although tourists are certainly malleable, business
planning for community development must either
budget for programs to change tourist preferences,
siphoning money from other conservation
initiatives (Kiss 2004a), or take existing preferences
into account. Biophysical context is certainly a
factor that needs to be considered in any analysis of
outcomes from ICDPs based on tourism. It is also
worth noting that most economic benefits from
ecotourism accrue to exogenous investors and
institutions rather than at the local level, and that
pro-poor tourism has many differences from proconservation tourism (Ashley et al. 2000).
Wood carving (Campbell and Luckert 2002), other
forms of art, transformed nontimber forest products,
and bio-prospecting are also steps in the direction
of a knowledge-based economy. Each implies an
ongoing need to maintain the quality of the resource
from which the products were obtained. All,
however, are uncomfortably balanced between
ecological constraints and economic reality.
Increased production to meet development goals
can threaten natural sustainable capacity and
conservation goals, whereas higher prices for
products increases the incentive for imitation and
competition from external sources. Again, one of
the ultimate constraints on ICDP success will be
biophysical context.
The knowledge-based industry that would
overcome these biophysical constraints would be
the creation of a genuine market for biodiversity
existence, either for its utilitarian values in terms of
ecosystem services such as the capture of
greenhouse gases and maintenance of water quality,
or as an aesthetic end in itself. However neither
market is yet established to the extent that it provides
an alternative to industries that reduce biodiversity.
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The theoretical development of such a market,
however, must take biophysical context into
account in any valuation.
Lesson 1.1: ICDPs that match their ambitions to
local biophysical productivity are more likely to
succeed than those that consider only human, social,
and economic factors.
Landscape diversity

which maximum gain is currently being extracted
have inherently low levels of resilience, and that the
further they are along any of those gradients, the
greater the cost of restoring resilience (Holling
1973, Gunderson and Holling 2002). This does not
mean that homogenous systems are not highly
resistant to change. Rather, we would contend that,
on appropriate temporal and spatial scales, when a
homogenous system is perturbed, it is more likely
than a heterogeneous system to shift to a different
regime (e.g., Allison 2004).

Historically, many ICDPs concentrated only on
areas of significant biodiversity, and often just on
protected areas (Wells et al. 2004). Increasingly,
these sites are being considered in a landscape
context. This not only allows more diverse options
for trade-offs but also makes it possible to maintain
the activities and values within those landscapes in
the face of change. The origins of the idea are
Darwinian, with the implication that, the greater the
variation in species, the greater their probability of
adapting successfully to new selective processes. In
biology, the benefits of herterozygosity and the
disadvantages of inbreeding are well known. In
ecology, there are parallels in intermediate levels of
disturbance (Horn 1975, Connell 1978). In
economics, there is financial risk hedging and
portfolio diversification theory (Bernoulli 1954,
Markowitz 1952, 1999). It follows that socialecological systems that include a diversity of ways
in which people can interact with their environment
for their social and economic benefit have a greater
range of options in the event of shocks compared to
those systems that lack variety, whether they be
environmental or economic. This idea is
encompassed by the concept of resilience, which is
“...a measure of how far the system can be perturbed
without shifting to a different regime” (Holling
1973, Walker et al. 2006).

Classifying natural systems with low levels of
human influence as unstable in an analysis of
resilience is counter-intuitive but follows from the
assumption that a little-used system is more
vulnerable to human pressure than one that has
survived human-induced perturbation and for which
humans acknowledge responsibility, even if that is
simply a decision to enforce protection to prevent
change. Finally, it also follows that, the further it is
along a gradient, the greater the chances that the
system will have crossed a resilience threshold from
which no return to the original unaltered state is
possible.

A logical extension of such a hypothesis is that, for
social-ecological systems to be resilient, they must
contain redundancy, duplication, and a gradation in
utility. Thus, maximizing short-term gain in a
social-ecological system and minimizing redundancy
reduces the capacity of the system to adapt to
change. Just as rare species in ecological systems
retain functional value at very low levels of
abundance (Zavaleta 2004), so small fragments in
a diverse landscape can play a vital role in that
landscape’s resilience and prosperity should
conditions change. It also follows that unaltered
landscapes, degraded landscapes, and those from

Demographic trends

For ICDPs it therefore follows that the ones that
invest across all forms of capital are likely to be
more resilient than those that attempt to maximize
investment in natural capital, even though that may
be the prime motivation of the bodies facilitating
the ICDP.
Lesson 1.2: Diverse landscapes are more resilient
than uniform ones, and the greater the disparity
between capital states, the greater the probability of
rapid change in states.
HUMAN CAPITAL

In many integrated conservation and development
projects (ICDPs) and subsequent case study
analyses, there appears to be an underlying
assumption that the number of people in the
landscape is relatively static. However, in resilience
literature (Gunderson and Holling 2002),
population change is one of the slow variables that
can drive the dynamics of a system once a threshold
has been passed. In setting up alternative enterprises
to redirect demand from biodiverse parts of the
landscape, there is rarely any discussion about what
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happens when those enterprises can no longer
support a growing population, as though population
growth is beyond the scope of ICDPs. This is partly
a function of the “tyranny of projects” (Sayer and
Wells 2004) that makes it difficult to take a longterm view. Nevertheless, in many cases, immediate
threats to biodiversity are underpinned by the
inexorable rise in population. Thus, the loss of fauna
from Ghanaian parks as a result of bushmeat
collecting is being accelerated by the reduction in
the availability of fish protein caused by European
fishing (Brashares et al. 2004), but this loss is
probably inevitable in the face of the increase in the
Ghanaian population and the lack of the economic
development that would give Ghanaians the income
levels needed to import protein.

the time it takes to make new arrangements (Aswani
and Hamilton 2004). However, where such changes
have been considered at all it is usually in terms of
community homogeneity, and even then such
information is scarce (Brooks et al. 2006).
Nevertheless, without information on demographic
trends, including trends in health and education
(Lutz and Goujon 2001), business planning for
development returns and sustainable harvest rates
is likely to be meaningless.

Absolute population size can also affect the
effectiveness of local regimes for governing natural
resources. In pre-agricultural societies, humans
usually interact closely with 150 other individuals
but can readily recognize the faces of 2000 (Dunbar
1998), and it may be that, above this level, there is
a threshold limit to the complexity of interactions
that require a qualitatively different governance
structure. Indonesian villages of more than 3000
inhabitants are thought to be too large to retain
effective traditional management of marine
resources (Harkes and Novaczek 2002), although
this depends on such factors as access to wider
markets (Cinner 2005), and villages with as many
as 14,000 inhabitants were able to maintain effective
traditional management in the 1990s (Evans et al.
1997). Trajectories in absolute population also have
implications for market size (Sayer and Campbell
2004), which are then reflected in rates of resource
exploitation. This can determine the nature and
speed of the development needed to maintain
existing standards of living, let alone improve them.
Hence, absolute population size can be less
important than the rate of change (Agrawal and
Chhatre 2006), particularly in those areas in which
the social capital that lubricates common property
management breaks down, social memory and
traditional knowledge are lost, and social
responsibility for the environment is marginalized
(Anderson 1991, Fentress and Wickham 1992,
Riddett 1995, Rogoff 2000, Pretty 2003, Pretty and
Smith 2004). Rapid immigration can disrupt the
local management of natural resources even more
than endogenous population growth (Cinner 2005),
and sudden influxes of refugees or other migrants
can sweep aside ICDPs based around local
populations (O’Herron 2004), not least because of

Integrated conservation and development
projects and community development

Lesson 2.1: ICDPs that consider, understand, and
accommodate trends in human demography are
more likely to demonstrate positive long-term
trends in measures of success.

Another limiting demographic factor in ICDP
trajectories is the availability of appropriate skills.
Delays in the importation or development of skills
is a fundamental constraint on ICDPs (McShane and
Newby 2004), whether they deal with natural
resource management, governance, or business
management. However, it is often not technical
capacity in the direct management of ICDPs that is
lacking. Rather, it is far more fundamental elements
of societal capacity. Just as ICDPs are increasingly
being conceptualized at a landscape scale, so it may
be necessary to broaden the view of ICDPs and
invest conservation funds more heavily in areas of
traditional community development such as health,
education, shelter, safety, and governance.
This places ICDPs firmly in the area of conventional
development programs, with considerations of
family planning, health, and education, especially
for women, becoming pivotal. Literature on ICDPs
suggests greater concern for the health of the
environment than that of people, but the two are
inextricably linked and need to be considered when
hypotheses about ICDPs are tested. Although there
is some concern that community development
proposals have had to expand their focus to take the
environment into account if they want to obtain
funding (Campbell and Vainio-Mattila 2003) and
that community development organizations
sometimes ignore the social and financial benefits
of wildlife conservation (Rogers 2005), those
promoting ICDPs may need to broaden their focus
if their conservation aims are to be sustained.
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Lesson 2.2: ICDP effectiveness is correlated with
broad-based measures of human capacity
development.
SOCIAL CAPITAL
Democracy and integrated conservation and
development projects
As with other forms of community development
(Campbell and Vainio-Mattila 2003), many
integrated conservation and development projects
(ICDPs) try to empower stakeholders by involving
them in research and development at all stages so
that they achieve ownership of the project objectives
(Sayer and Campbell 2004). Frequently, this
involves the empowerment of those with less power
in the community, particularly women, who often
have a vested interest in sustaining natural resources
because they are usually the ones who collect and
use them to maintain subsistence inputs to the
household (Ostrom 1990, Agrawal and Chhatre
2006). Community development programs of this
type are particularly effective at fostering “strong
democracy,” which is emerging as the major
alternative to “thin democracy,” national
parliamentary representation that is often distant
from community influence and generally promotes
market-led globalization (Powell and Geoghegan
2006). There is empirical evidence that the
democratization of decision making can benefit
natural resource quality; in the Indian Himalaya,
natural resource quality was more likely to be
maintained in those areas in which there was a
reasonable probability that community leadership
could change (Agrawal and Chhatre 2006).
Democratization can also reduce corruption, which
is increasingly seen as a threat to conservation
(Smith and Walpole 2005) and thus the
effectiveness of ICDPs. On the other hand, strong,
stable leadership can also have benefits. In
Cameroon, the relative success of the conservation
program at Kilum/Ijim is the result of the absolute
authority of the local traditional leader, the Fon
(Gartlan 2004), although such systems are rarely
stable for long.
With respect to governance appraisal of ICDPs,
progress may benefit from the application of the
World Bank measures of the six dimensions of
governance: (1) voice and accountability, (2)
political stability and the absence of violence, (3)
government effectiveness, (4) regulatory quality,

(5) the rule of law, and (6) control of corruption
(Kaufmann et al. 2005). Such measures are
regularly recorded at a national level, with the
information on scores and trends freely available,
and some can be applied at regional and local levels,
although, to ensure that governance measures
encompass local concerns, the six dimensions may
be just the starting point for discussions about how
to measure governance equity. Alternatively, there
is a range of principles derived by Anderies et al.
(2004) for robustness in social-ecological systems
that have as their basis democratic principles and
community involvement in decision making.
Institutions that were fragile or collapsed had
followed few of these principles; enduring ones had
followed most of them.
Lesson 3.1: ICDP effectiveness is positively
correlated with national and regional governance
scores and/or indicators of robustness of socialecological systems.
Tenure
A lack of identified ownership of land or sea has
long been seen as leading inevitably to the
overexploitation of shared resources (Hardin 1968).
Although there is ample theoretical and empirical
evidence that cooperation is a fundamental element
of human behavior based on sound theoretical
principles (Hrushka and Heinrich 2006), and there
are plenty of examples, at scales from local to global,
to show that communities can develop rules for
managing common property (Ostrom 1990), the
lack of secure tenure is seen as particularly critical
in those areas in which government has replaced
traditional land ownership regimes (Adams 2001,
Sayer and Campbell 2004). However, security of
tenure is not always an effective means of protecting
natural capital. When equitable tenure is
established, it can then provide incentives to invest
in built capital rather than conserve natural capital.
Although sustainable management of natural
resources is seen as one of the benefits of land
reform, the capacity to invest in agricultural
intensification is an even more desirable
consequence (Feder and Nishio 1998, Deininger
2004). Nor does secure communal tenure
necessarily protect natural values. Traditional
marine tenure is secure under national law in New
Guinea, but this has not prevented the
overexploitation of coral (Cinner 2005), whereas,
in Burkina Faso, traditional communal tenure is
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considered sufficiently secure to enable investment
in agricultural intensification (Brasselle et al. 2002).
At a more fundamental level, one result of the
enclosure of the commons in 17th-century England
was that those who used them felt no responsibility
for them, a philosophy that suffuses modern
capitalism and its concept of natural capital as a
natural resource (Appleby 1976, 1978). Thus,
secure tenure and land title may not be a universal
panacea for poor management of the commons, and
a hypothesis to test this should be developed.

ownership (Binswanger 1991). Nevertheless, in
some countries there has been an orderly transfer of
ownership from government to private or communal
ownership with substantial benefits for the
communities concerned (Deininger 2004). The key
has been working at different levels of governance
at the appropriate time. This applies to most ICDPs,
which inevitably work within a multiscale
environment with different complexities of
governance at each level (Sayer and Campbell
2004).

Lesson 3.2: ICDPs are more effective in areas in
which there are stable, transparent, and equitable
systems of land or sea ownership.

Lesson 3.3: The effectiveness of ICDPs is improved
by appropriately sequencing interventions across
multiple scales and levels of governance.

Sequencing interventions

BUILT CAPITAL

ICDPs would not be necessary if there were not a
perceived need to change existing practices and
disturb the established order. However, because
power is relative, changes such as democratization
inevitably reduce the power of others in society,
either in government or in the community itself.
Although the ICDP literature is effusive in its
espousal of community empowerment, it is notably
less forthcoming about techniques for decreasing
the power of those who are already holding it, and
usually there is strong resistance from vested
interests (Adams 2001, McShane and Newby 2004,
Child and Dalal-Clayton 2004, Agrawal and
Chhatre 2006). In the Luangwa Valley in Zambia,
transparent systems for distributing the benefits of
integrated conservation and development exposed
the corruption of senior chiefs, who were then
deposed (Child and Dalal-Clayton 2004), but such
examples are rare. The change in Zambia was
possible only because the facilitators of the ICDP
had worked in an appropriate sequence across
several scales, strengthening local institutions while
at the same time maintaining the resolve of the aid
agency. This illustrates the interaction between the
different scales of governance within which any
ICDP will operate and the sequence in which
interventions are undertaken.

The trade-off of built capital for natural capital

The order in which interventions occur can be
critical to eventual outcomes. For instance, if
changes in land tenure laws are handled poorly, the
results can include major conflicts (Deininger
2004), the development of landed elites (Adams
2001), or even the felling of forest to establish land

Case studies of integrated conservation and
development projects (ICDPs) rarely consider the
importance of built capital to program persistence,
and there is an underlying assumption that the
creation of infrastructure generally increases the
level of threat to natural capital values. The
development component of ICDPs is thus
commonly considered to be the development of
social, financial, and human capital without the
uncomfortable recognition that built capital may be
a precondition for some of the other types of
development. Sometimes the lack of built capital is
an explicit measure of the value of natural capital,
as in the definition of wilderness as being largely
devoid of human influence, e.g., the U.S.
Wilderness Act of 1963. This is in marked contrast
to community development, in which the creation
of housing or other facilities is a measure of success
that reinforces social capital (Knotts 2006), because
there is often a significant association between the
development of built capital and subsequent
increases in income (Fedderke et al. 2006). In poor
societies, built capital may be the primary benefit
derived from conservation projects (Hellquist
2004). In both literal and figurative senses, built
capital is seen as a concrete measure of the success
of development programs. In fact, built capital is
sometimes the sole measure of success and, such is
the durability of concrete, steel, and tar, that the
construction of roads and solid buildings then
shapes the society for which they were built (Scott
1998).
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The development of built capital almost always has
both positive and negative effects on other capitals;
some built capital can degrade other capitals even
with the best intentions (e.g., Lam 1996). Certainly,
goods usually need roads for transport to market;
effective education is usually conducted under a
roof; e-marketing needs computers, telecommunications,
and sources of power; and tourists wealthy enough
to improve local incomes usually demand physical
comforts. However, each of these can involve tradeoffs. Roads for transformed, sustainably harvested
nontimber forest products can carry logging trucks,
education can provide no more than a passport to
the city, and digital communication simply
increases awareness of unattainable urban
consumerism, whereas the byproduct of urban
wealth, the rich fickle tourist, can destroy the very
assets that attract them. Many of these assertions are
common sense; some have been tested empirically,
such as the negative association between access to
markets and the strength of traditional governance
regimes for marine resources (Cinner 2005). The
results of this trend are also equivocal. Although
Scott (1998) would maintain that the inexorable
spread of built capital, while usually raising local
health, education, and personal wealth, is essentially
an extension of state control over its citizens, this
allows greater exploitation or more effective
protection of natural capital for all of the nation’s
citizens, not just those with immediate access to that
capital. There are thus two inescapable questions:
Is the development of built capital a necessary
condition for the success of ICDPs, and under what
circumstances has built capital contributed to
positive trends in all capitals?
Lesson 4.1: It is necessary to trade off natural for
built capital if other capitals are to increase and
associated ICDPs are to persist.
FINANCIAL CAPITAL
Environmental payments vs. belief systems
One of the principal underlying assumptions of
integrated conservation and development projects
(ICDPs) is that there must be financial
compensation for any loss of opportunity arising
from biodiversity conservation. There is empirical
evidence that biodiversity, as opposed to individual
useful species and processes, is more valuable
globally than locally (e.g., Kremen et al. 2000). As
Kiss (2004b) maintains, those seeking biodiversity

conservation in poor countries are usually external
stakeholders competing with both local values and
other external stakeholders who place greater value
on the resources they can extract. In this sense,
proponents of ICDPs follow a long tradition. The
similarities between biodiversity advocates and
religious missionaries in previous centuries are
sometimes uncomfortably close (Grove 1989), and
there are arguments that conservation biology has
many of the characteristics of a religion (Taylor
2001). Alternatively, biodiversity conservation can
be seen as a new form of colonialism, an
incomprehensible imposed value that is only
possible because of an economically driven power
imbalance (Hellquist 2004), and it can be argued
that payment for services makes this relationship
explicit, transparent, and negotiable.
This approach, however, assumes that the
motivations of all the communities requiring
development are essentially materialistic. By
implication, this suggests that the Stoic-Christian
traditions, which deny any moral relationship
between humans and nature (Passmore 1974), are
universal, or at least that their universal domination
is inevitable. In fact, materialistic attitudes to the
environment only began to dominate in the west in
the Middle Ages, as part of the efforts of the Catholic
church to counter the “superstitions” of animism,
and spread elsewhere round the globe through
colonial mercantilism and Marxist analyses of
capitalism (Appleby 1976, 1978, Thomas 1983).
Outside the west, there are numerous long-standing
unbroken traditions in the major religions (e.g.,
Sivaraksa 1989, Sharma et al. 1999, Khalid 2002,
Negi 2005) and at the local level (e.g., Byers et al.
2001, Jones and Young 2004, Bhagwat et al. 2005,
Xu 2005) that effectively conserve biodiversity
without financial compensation. In such cases,
supporting those who advocate the maintenance of
local traditions may be more effective than
providing payments.
Other views are also long-standing in the Christian/
materialistic tradition. The modern concern with
biodiversity and heavy investment in its protection
are at least as much a consequence of 18th-century
romanticism as of utilitarian arguments that
biodiversity conservation is essential for the
survival of the human species (Thomas 1983). The
heterogeneity of environmental values may explain
the equivocal results of analyses of ICDPs by
Salafsky et al. (2002) and Brooks et al. (2006). Thus,
there may be situations in which financial support
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may merely replace, and could undermine, local
traditions of conservation.
Nevertheless, powerful economic forces and
motivations usually do overwhelm both local
philosophies that are consistent with conservation
and those promulgated by proponents of ICDPs.
Furthermore, religion can favor environmental
degradation as much as oppose it (Greeley 1993).
In many cases, regardless of philosophy, people
living with nature cannot afford to bear the costs
incurred by foregoing the opportunities offered by
alternative and mutually exclusive land uses. For
instance, as shown by the behaviour of the Punan
in Kalimantan (Levang et al. 2003), few parents
eschew opportunities to increase the probability that
their children will survive, even if it means
abandoning sustainable traditions. Further, community
homogeneity is a myth. Even in traditional societies,
at least some members of the community are
actively seeking to increase their status through
alternative exploitative land uses. The difficulty
then is to provide sufficient ongoing funds to match
alternatives, always being aware that any funding
slippage may be irredeemable in terms of land-use
change and biodiversity loss. The difficulty is that,
beyond subsistence, poverty is relative, and the
desire for status is never satisfied (de Botton 2004).
Thus, it could be argued that financial compensation
for those with food, water, security, and shelter is
less effective in the long term than the
internalization of the belief that biodiversity has
intrinsic value by those making critical decisions
about land use.
Lesson 5.1: Financial incentives are especially
important in those areas in which belief-based
constraints on environmental exploitation are
ineffective.
Contracts, targets, and milestones
Assuming that payments of some kind are required
for the provision of biodiversity services from
communities that can either not afford to maintain
them or do so only under duress, there remains the
highly contentious issue of how best to pay for them.
Ferraro (2001), Kiss (2004b), and others suggest
that payments for environmental services (PES) are
the most cost-effective means of improving the
welfare of communities and of maintaining
biodiversity, because they represent a simple trade

based on measurable outputs, with payment being
provided only on the basis of delivery (Wunder
2005). However, although this has been achieved
effectively in places like Holland (e.g., Musters et
al. 2001), Salafsky and Margoulis (2004), Wunder
(2005), and others are sceptical about the
practicalities in places in which institutions have
less control, and can point to few examples in poor
countries in which the idea has been taken up
profitably and with enthusiasm.
In his recent review of PES, Wunder (2005)
recognized four situations in which such payments
are currently occurring: carbon sequestration,
biodiversity protection, watershed protection, and
landscape beauty. However, in each case there
appeared to be a relatively narrow range of
situations in which benefits were likely to accrue to
local communities. A major concern is that a system
of ongoing payments for ecosystem services means
that those services persist only as long as there is a
market for them. Any intermission in funding
supply, a frequent problem when projects run for 5
yr or less, opens those services, and the resources
on which they are based, to bids from other users.
Alternatively, major inputs of conservation funding
to set aside natural capital can disempower people
by preventing them from undertaking what they see
as legitimate land-development opportunities. The
landless are likely to be the most disempowered,
because they have no services to sell. In fact, PES
can be counterproductive if, despite compensation,
the loss of agricultural land leads to more hunting
(Johannesen 2006).
Both cash or in-kind payments have drawbacks
(Wunder 2005). An alternative strategy for
delivering payments is through the employment of
participants in action research with regular
performance reviews, defining sustainability as an
ongoing process of change and adaptation (Sayer
and Campbell 2004). Payments are thus integrated
into processes that provide other benefits to the
community, as is reflected in the results of Salafsky
et al. (2002). All these methods, however, are new,
and their durability is still untested. Even case
studies are relatively few, especially in poorer
countries, and a lot of questions regarding the
circumstances under which PES are most likely to
be successful, how long they should last, how
delivery should be enforced, and related costs all
need to be answered before a testable hypothesis
can be formulated.
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Lesson 5.2: Environmental payments are likely to
be more effective in facilitating improved
livelihoods if they are administered through
contractual arrangements linked to targets and
milestones.
HYPOTHESIS TESTING
There is some urgency to find patterns among
integrated conservation and development projects
(ICDPs) that work. Nearly all agencies wishing to
undertake community development now use the
language of sustainability and have aims that are
ostensibly similar to those of ICDPs (Appendix 1).
Although the extent to which different capitals are
emphasized varies between organizations, the
fundamental philosophies are the same. As
Campbell and Vainio-Mattila (2003) pointed out,
although integrated conservation and development
have taken over the participatory community
development agenda, neither the empirical nor the
theoretical basis of success has been determined. It
is certainly naïve to assume that any of these
hypotheses can be tested independently. It is also
likely that there will be a diverse range of correlates
with successful and unsuccessful ICDPs, to say
nothing of trying to perform the difficult task of
testing what would have happened had no ICDP
been attempted (Ferraro and Pattanayak 2006).
Diversity in governance (Ostrom 2005) and in
routes to sustainability (Kemp et al. 2005) is thought
to be as important as genetic variation in the
evolution of the robust social-ecological systems
that are the ultimate objectives ICDPs.
To take the lessons we have proposed and test them
as hypotheses will depend on the collection of
enough relevant data at a range of appropriate
temporal and spatial scales. Existing studies almost
always acknowledge the limitations of small sample
sizes, an excessive number of variables, and, often,
the selective geographically or environmentally
confined nature of their sample sizes (McShane and
Newby 2004, Cinner 2005, Agrawal and Chhatre
2006). Similarly, Brooks et al. (2006) were unable
to find adequate data to test a smaller range of
hypotheses to their full extent.
There is, potentially, a far wider range of case
studies from which to draw data than might be
anticipated. As it is, some existing local data sets (e.
g., Gjertsen 2005, Hayes and Ostrom 2005, Agrawal
and Chhatre 2006) are impressively large and are

already making it possible to test certain hypotheses.
The adoption of sustainability principles by so many
organizations with a wide variety of aims also
expands the range of examples from which to draw
data for analysis.
There is also an expanding range of statistical tools
with which such data can be analyzed. A modern
statistical portfolio includes influence diagrams,
logic trees, Bayes nets, Monte Carlo simulations,
fuzzy logic, and decision theory as well as
multifactorial analysis, principal component
analysis, and other more conventional techniques
for data mining. An essential part of any model
building will be the optimization of gain in all five
capitals. Alternatively, one might test the social
success of ICDPs using the new generation of
happiness indices (e.g., Cummins et al. 2003); as
recognised by Stem et al. (2005), ICDP monitoring
and evaluation needs to learn a few lessons from the
social sciences if it is to understand the processes
leading to robustness and resilience. Ultimately, the
aim of the analyses will be to identify the features
of ICDPs that are most likely to achieve their diverse
aims and give guidance where currently there are
hunches and suppositions.
Responses to this article can be read online at:
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol12/iss1/art2/responses/
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APPENDIX 1
Table A-1. Objectives of a selection of international conservation and development agencies showing the
extent to which the rhetoric of integrated conservation development has been adopted.

Emphasis

Name

Mission

Conservation

Convention on International Trade in
To ensure that international trade in specimens of wild animals
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and and plants does not threaten their survival
Flora (CITES)
Nature Conservancy

To preserve the plants, animals, and natural communities that
represent the diversity of life on Earth by protecting the lands
and waters they need to survive

Flora and Fauna International

To protect the entire spectrum of endangered plant and animal
species on the planet

A balance
Conservation International
between conservation and
development

To conserve the Earth’s living natural heritage and global
biodiversity, and to demonstrate that human societies are able to
live harmoniously with nature

Global Environment Facility

To achieve agreed-upon global environmental benefits in areas
such as biological diversity; climate change; international waters;
land degradation, primarily desertification and deforestation;
ozone layer depletion; and persistent organic pollutants

IUCN

To influence, encourage, and assist societies throughout the
world to conserve the integrity and diversity of nature and to
ensure that any use of natural resources is equitable and
ecologically sustainable

Wildlife Conservation Society

To save wildlife and wild lands, change attitudes toward nature,
and help people imagine wildlife and humans living in
sustainable interaction on both a local and a global scale

Naturschutzbund Deutschland

To protect biological diversity and ensure that future generations
can live on a planet with a wider diversity of species and habitats
as well as clean air and water, healthy soil, and as many
nonrenewable resources as possible

Friends of the Earth International
(FOEI)

To create a peaceful and sustainable world based on societies
living in harmony with nature and ensure social, economic,
gender, and environmental justice free from all forms of
domination and exploitation

(con'd)
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BirdLife International

To help, through birds, to conserve biodiversity andimprove the
quality of people's lives; to integrate bird conservation into
sustaining people's livelihoods

World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF)

To stop the degradation of the planet’s natural environment and
build a future in which humans live in harmony with nature

WorldFish Centre

To enhance the well-being of present and future generations of
poor people in the developing world through improved
production, management, and conservation of living aquatic
resources

World Agroforestry Center

To work toward mitigating tropical deforestation, land depletion,
and rural poverty through improved agroforestry systems

International Plant Genetic Resources
Institute (IGPRI)

To advance the conservation and use of genetic diversity for the
well-being of present and future generations

Norwegian Agency for Development
Cooperation (NORAD)

To combat poverty and contribute to lasting improvements in
living standards and quality of life; to promote peace,
democracy, and human rights and the responsible management
and use of the global environment and biological diversity

International Water Management
Institute (IWMI)

To improve water and land resources management for food
livelihoods and nature

International Centre for Underutilised
Crops (ICUC)

To reduce poverty and suffering through the improvement and
promotion of underutilized crops for food, medicines, fodder,
and industrial needs, and also for environmental protection

Center for International Cooperation in To contribute to rural development in tropical and subtropical
Agricultural Research for Development countries in the fields of agriculture, forestry, and agrifoods,
(CIRAD)
including environmental issues and natural resource management
Tropenbos

To improve forest management for the benefit of people,
conservation, and sustainable development

Center for International Forestry
Research (CIFOR)

To conserve forests and improve the livelihoods of people in the
tropics; to help local communities and small farmers gain their
rightful share of forest resources while increasing the production
and value of forest products

International Rice Research Institute
(IRRI)

To improve the well-being of present and future generations of
rice farmers and consumers, particularly those with low incomes;
to generate and disseminate rice-related knowledge and
technology of short- and long-term environmental, social, and
economic benefit

(con'd)
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International Institute of Tropical
Agriculture (IITA)

To enhance the food security, income, and well-being of
resource-poor people in sub-Saharan Africa; to increase
agricultural production, improve food systems, and sustainably
manage natural resources

International Food Policy Research
Institute (IFPRI)

To improve food security and nutrition, with an emphasis on
low-income countries and poor people and on the sound
management of the natural resources base that supports
agriculture

Centro Internacional de Agricultura
Tropical (CIAT)

To conduct socially and environmentally progressive research
aimed at reducing hunger and poverty and preserving natural
resources in developing countries

Africa Rice Center (WARDA)

To contribute to poverty alleviation and food security and to
increase the productivity and profitability of the rice sector in
ways that ensure the sustainability of the farming environment

Australian Centre for International
Agricultural Research (ACIAR)

To improve sustainable agricultural production in developing
countries

Centro Internacional de Mejoramiento
de Maiz y Trigo (CIMMYT)

To serve the poor in developing countries; to increase food
security, improve the productivity and profitability of farming
systems, and sustain natural resources

International Center for Agricultural
Research in the Dry Areas (ICARDA)

To improve the welfare of poor people and alleviate poverty
through research and training in dry areas of the developing
world, by increasing the production, productivity, and nutritional
quality of food while preserving and enhancing the natural
resource base

Centro Internacional de la Papa (CIP)

To reduce poverty and achieve food security on a sustained basis
in developing countries by improved management of natural
resources in the Andes and other mountain areas

International Crops Research Institute
for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT)

To serve the poorest of the poor in the semi-arid areas of the
developing world and to give a human face to the science and
agricultural research that we do with our partners

Consultative Group for International
Agricultural Research (CGIAR)

To achieve sustainable food security and reduce poverty in
developing countries in the fields of agriculture, livestock,
forestry, policy, and natural resources management

Economic deve- International Development Research
lopment
Centre (IDRC)

To solve critical development problems

(con'd)
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Australian Agency for International
Development (AusAID)

To advance Australia’s national interest by helping developing
countries reduce poverty and achieve sustainable development

International Livestock Research
Institute (ILRI)

To improve agricultural systems in which livestock are important

Technical Centre for Agricultural and
Rural Cooperation (CTA)

To develop and provide services that improve access to
information for agricultural and rural development

UK Department of International
Development

To combat the spread of HIV and AIDS in Africa, promote
poverty reduction programs, reduce debt, boost access to
markets, and support peace processes

International Fund for Agricultural
Development (IFAD)

To enable the rural poor to overcome poverty

International Development Association To promote economic development, increase productivity, and
(IDA)
thus raise standards of living in the less-developed areas of the
world
United States Agency for International
Development (USAID)

To encourage long-term and equitable economic growth and
advance U.S. foreign policy objectives by supporting economic
growth, agriculture, and trade; global health; and democracy,
conflict prevention, and humanitarian assistance

